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IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID G. PEARSON and 
ELVA P. PEARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v~. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a mmlicipal 
corporation, BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SAT,T LAKE 
COUNTY and LAMONT B. 
GUNDERSEN, EDWI~ Q. CAJ\"-
NON and ABRAHA:\1 BARKER, 
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF 
COCNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9042 
The appellants, David G. Pearson and Elva P. 
Pearson, will be referred to herein as plainLilfs, and 
the respondents, Salt Lake Connty, et al. will be re--
ferred to as defendants. 
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This proceeding originated in the District Court 
as an action for a declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief. The action concern_ed the validity of 
Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
1.be said Chapter 7 is described as an act au-
thorizing boards of county commissions to create in 
their respective counties improvement districts for 
the making of local improvements and the financing 
thereof through the levying of special assessments 
on benefited property, providing for the collection 
and enforcement of such assessments, authorizing the 
issuance of warrants and nego.tiable bonds payable 
for such assessments, providing for the levy of a tax 
on the real property of such districts for the establish-
ment of a guarantee fund to assure the payment of 
such bonds, providing for the manner in which 
such assessments, taxes and bonds may be contested, 
and making certain provisions in connection with 
the foregoing, and repealing the improvement dis-
trict statutes as they are originally set forth in Chap-
ter 7, Title 17 of U.C.A. 1953 <R. 1, 62). 
The plaintiffs are residents and owners of real 
property located within the boundaries of Special 
Improvement District ::'\lo. 1 in Salt Lake County. 
Utah, \vhich defendants purport to have created pur-
suant to Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953 as amended 
(R, 2, 62). This District includes property abutting 
on the north and south sides of the Murray-Taylors-
ville Road (48th South) between the west side of 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Redwood Road and the east side Gf 11th \.Vest Street 
in Salt Lake County, Utah (R_ 12). 
Plaintiffs are and ·will be directly affected by the 
defendants proceeding under said statute in that they 
will become liable for the payment Gf an assessment 
to be levied, and the title and interest of the plaintiffs 
in their real property within the said lmprovemellt 
District will be clouded and adversely affected and 
subject to lien and be subject to being proceeded 
against for the collection of an assessment (R. 5, 63). 
Pursuant to the provisions Gf Chapter 7, Title 17, 
C.C.A. 1953, as amended, the Board of Cow1ty Com-
missioners on February 21, 1958, adopted a resolution 
purporting to create Special Improvement District 
No. 1 of Salt Lake County for the purpose of making 
improvements on the sireets of said district and fi-
nancing these improvements by a proposed levy 
against the real property \vithin said District (R. 12-
23). Subsequent notices were given (R. 2+-45) 
and hearings were held and on April 21, 1958, the 
Board of County Commissioners adopted a resolution 
specifically setting forth the amounts of the assess-
ments against each piece of property and a finding 
that no amounts assessed ·would exceed the bcnefiLs 
to be derived by each piece of property from the im-
provements to be constructed and that no assess-
ment against any piece Gf property would constitute 
more than that property's prGper proportionate share 
of the total cost of the improvements to be made 
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<R. 46-59). Notice of the adoption of this resolution 
was adequately given CR. 60, 61). 
The improvements to be made in the District 
will all be constructed on public property CR. 95l 
and will consist of curb and gutters, sidewalks, and 
driveways. However, the improvements will not be 
uniforrn as to all property within the district. Some 
property vvill have curb and gutters, sidewalks, and 
driveways; other property will have only curb and 
gutter and driveways; other property only curb and 
gutter and sidewalk; and other property will have 
only curb and gutter (R. 48-48a). 
·,Plaintiffs agree that in the creation of the pur-
ported Special Improvement District and in their 
proceedings to date, the defendants have complied 
with the statutory and the State and Federal Consti-
tutions as to notice and hearings CR. 2-3, 62). How-
ever, the defendants now propose to invite bids for 
construction, award a contract therefor. and upon 
final determination of the cost of said improve-
ments, to leYy and collect assessments against each 
piece of real property within said District CR. 3-·l, 
62). 
The plaintiffs contend that the making of the 
improvements as contemplated will violate the 
Statute itself CR. +-0! and the Utah Sta\f' and Fed-
eral Constitutions (R. 4-6). Further, plaintiffs con-
tend that any levy of assessments and of a special 
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tax as provided and contemplaLed by the sLaLute \Vill 
be invalid and uncollectible in thut such provisions 
of the Statute violate the Utah State and Federal 
Constitutions m. 4-9). Such statutory and constitu-
tional violations are set forth in particular in the 
Statement of Points and Argument belmv. Plaintiffs 
alsO contend that Lhe statute is void, ineffective und 
without force of law in that it is so vague and am-
biguous as to be impossible of construction and nse 
m. 9) and the particulars in this regard are ~et out 
below. 
The trial of the issues vvus held vvithout jury on 
February 3, 1959 (R. 78) and the court found and 
ruled against the contentions of the plaintiffs and 
upheld the validity of the statutes and denied injunc-
tive relief (R. 113-122 I. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. Non-unifonnity of Improvements Within Distri~t Makes it Im-
possible to Determine That Each Piece of Property is Bearing 
"Proper Proportionate Shore of Total Cost of Improvement" 
as Required by 17-7-13, 14, U.C.A., 1953, as Amended. 
II. Assessment or Tax for Private Driveways Violates Section 5 
of Article XIII Utah Constitution in That it is an Assessmenl 
or Tax for a Private Purpose. 
111. Special Tax Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A., 1953, as Amended, 
in Effect Would Allow Creation of Debt by County in Excess 
of Taxes for Current Year in Violation of Section 3, Article 
XIV, Utah Constitution. 
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IV. Issuance of County Bonds as Provided by 17-7-21, 22, 23, 
U.C.A., 1953, os Amended Violates Debt Limitation of Sec-
tion 4, Article XIV, Utah Constitution. 
V. Speciol Tox Provided by 17-7-26 U.C.A. '19S3, as Amended, 
on Real Property Only ViolatE)$ Sections 2 cmd 3, Article XIII, 
Utah Constitution which Require "All Tangible Property" to 
be Asseued ond Ta>~:ed. 
VI. Special Ta>~: Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A., 1953 as Amended, 
Would Be to Pay o Privote Debt in Violation of Section S, 
Article XIII, Utah Constitution. 
VII. Special Levy Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A. 19S3, as Amended, 
is Without Notice or Heoring in Violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, United States Con$1itution, ond Section 7, Article 
I, Utah Constitution. 
VIII. Priority of the Levy of AsseS5ment Provided by 17-7-19, 
U.C.A. 1953, os Amended, Is Invalid. 
IX. Chapter 7 Is So Vague ond Uncertain as to Be Inoperative 
ond Void. 
Point I. 
Non-uniformity of Improvements Within District 
Mokes it Impossible ta Determine That Each Piece of 
Property is Bearing "Proper Proportionate Shore of 
Total Cost of Improvement" as Required by 17-7-13 
and 14, U.C.A. 1953, crs Amended. 
The determination of nearh all of the issues in 
this case will turn upon the construction of the vari-
ous provisions of Chapter 7, Title 17, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. In construing statutes 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
providing for special or local assessments, they should 
be strictly construed in favor of the owners of the 
property assessed. The rule in this regard is set forth 
.in 48 Am. Jur.-Special and Local Assessments, Sec-
tion 4, page 567, as follm.,·s: 
"The general rule is that statutes provid-
ing for special or local assessments are to be 
strictly construed and strictly applied in favor 
of the O\vner or owners of the property assessed 
and against the ass~sing authority." 
' 
The resolution o£ the Board of County Com-
missioners contained in Exhibit D of plaintil{s' Com-
plaint, which sets forth the schedule of proposed 
assessments shows that the improvements to be con-
structed as part of the overall improvement project, 
are not uniform as to the properties to be assessed. 
Some properties are to be improved through the con-
struction of curbs, gutters, side-...valks, and t:lrivev\'ays; 
others only through the construction of curbs, gut-
ters, and driveways; others through the construction 
of onl.Y curbs, gutters, and sidewalks; and others 
through the construction of onl:v curbs and gutters. 
Sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 7 of the said Title 
17 require that the amount assessed against an ovv:n-
er's property shall not constitute "more than his 
proper proportionate share of the total cost of im-
provement." Since the improvements are not gOing 
to be uniform as to each piece of property assessed, 
it becomes impossible accurately to detennine the 
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prope~ proportionate share of the total cost of the 
improvement to be assessed against each property. 
Particularly, it becomes impossible to- accurately de-
termine the pro-per proportionate share when allocat-
ing costs of the improvements as engineering, legal 
fees, inspection, publishing notices, interest on 
interim warrants, and other expenses incidental to 
the project as are set forth on page 3 of Exhibit ''A" 
attached to the plaintiffs' Complaint. 
It is apparent that it is not proper to include in 
a single assessment program and assessment district 
properties which are to be improved with different 
kinds of improvements, and the defendants, in at-
tempting to do so, are at the outset, violating the 
Statute and making it impossible of application, and 
they should be enjoined from proceeding further. 
Point II. 
Assessment or Tax for Private DrivewaY' Violates 
Section 5, Article Xlll, Utgh Constitution in that it is on 
Assessment or Tax for a Private Purpose. 
The imposition of assessments for driveways for 
some properties and not for others as referred to in 
Point I a hove amounts to the imposition of an assess-
ment or tax for a private as distinguished from a pub--
lic purpose. and it is in contraw'utiou of the constitu-
tiunal requirement that all forms of taxes levied 
by a governmental subdivision, including special 
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assessments, must be levied only for a public purpose. 
Section ') of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution 
provides as follows: 
"The legislatlU'e shull not impose taxes 
for the purpose of any county, city, town or 
other municipal corporation but may. by law, 
vest in the corporate uuthorities thereof, re-
spectively, the pmver to assess and collect 
taxes for all purposes of such corporation." 
The testimony adduced by Lhe defendants at 
the trial on this issue, showed that the benefit to be 
derived by the installalion and construction Of Lhe 
driveways for some of the private property owners 
was mainly for the benefit of such privale pmperty 
0\Vners. This is not only in violation of the above 
section of the Utah Constitution, it also violates the 
generul requirements for the validity of any special 
or local assessment. The rule .ii1 this regard is set 
forth in 48 Am. Jur.-Local AssNsments, Section 22, 
page 'iH2, which states: 
"It is necessary to the validity of a special 
or local assessment that the improvement for 
which il is made be a public, nol a private, 
improvement.'-
The Utah court has clearly ruled that the ·words 
"for all purposes of such corporation" contained :in 
the above Section 5 of Article XIII means that the 
power to assess and collect taxes vested in counties 
by the Legislature must be exercised only in cormcc-
9 
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• 
tion vvith public pm·poses. In the case of Denver and 
R.G.R. Co. vs. Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 
3 A.L.R. 1224, Section 5 of Article XIII was con-
strued and it was there stated: 
"The phrase 'for all purposes of such 
corporation' is synonymous vvith the phrase 
'public purpo~es.' " 
In view of the defendants' admission th<it assess-
ments and taxes are to be made and collected for the 
construction of private driveways, it seems clear that 
such action should be enjoined. Counsel has been un-
able to find any case that has construed a driveway 
leading to private property to be a public purpose. 
Further, the consent of the present property owners 
involved cannot waive this constitutional provision 
so that it would be binding either on the present own-
ers or future owners. It is fundamental that indi-
vidual property owners cannot vest rights or take 
actions that contravene the express prohibitions and 
limitations of the Constitution. It would be a strange 
and dangerous precedent to provide that just because 
a particular group of people at some particular time 
consented to the abrogation of constitutional limita-
tions, the Court would countenance and enforce such 
arrangement. 
Point Ill. 
Speciol Tox Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A. 1953, 
os Amended, in Effect Would Allow Creation of Debt 
10 
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by County in Excess of Taxes for Current Year Without 
an Election in Violation of Section 3, Article XIV, Utah 
Constitution. 
Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, provides as 
follows: 
"'i,Vhenever it shall appear that lhe 
special assessments pledged to the paymPnt 
of any special improvement bonds issued ~nere­
under, have not been or will not be collected 
m an amotmt sufficient to assure the yrompl 
payment of all principal and interest du,, en 
such bonds, the Board of County Commis-
sioners shall levy on all real property within 
the issuing improvement district a speda! tax 
in an amount sufficient to prevent such de-
fault, or if such default shall have occurred, 
sufficient to remedy such default." 
It is this Section which \vould giYe substance and 
worth to the bonds to be sold to finance the projects 
of the Improvement District. In fact, without this 
provision it is doubtful that the bonds could ever 
be marketed. However, it is in direct violation of 
Section 3 of Article XIV of the lltah Constitution 
which reads as follows: 
"1\" o debt in excess of the taxes for the 
current year shall be created by any cotrnty or 
subdivision thereof, or by any school district 
therein, or by any city, town or village, or 
any subdivision thereof in this state; unless 
the proposition to create such debt, shall have 
been submitted to a vote of such qualified 
11 
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• 
electors as shall have paid a property tux 
therein, in the year preceding such election, 
and a majority of those voting thereon shall 
have voted in favor of incurring such debt." 
The issuance of bonds supported by this pledge 
of the taxing power of the county as provided l?Y said 
Section 26 would amount to the creation of a debt. 
This is the pledge of anticipated revenue through fu-
ture taxation by the county. It would amount to the 
creation of a debt in excess of cUITent revenues with-
out the necessary election. The a hove referred to pro-
visions of Section 3 of Article XIV are applicable, and 
any bonds issued under said Chapter 7 in reliance 
upon the credit which the a hove quoted Section 
26 of Chapter 7 attempts to allow would be invalid 
unless such credit or indebtedness was authorized 
by a prior election either throughout the county or 
throughout the area within which such taxes are 
to be levied as required by this Section of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The Utah Court has had occasion to apply the 
constitutional provisions of the said Section 3 of 
Article XIV in a number of different circumstances. 
It is noted in reviewing these cases, that the court 
has been careful in applying and using the said Sec-
tion 3 as a strict protection against unauthorized in-
roads into future taxes \Yithout the approval of the 
taxpayer as is required by said Section. The follow-
ing language is used in the case of Barnes z·s. Lehi 
City, 71· Utah 32L HO, 279, P. 878: 
12 
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"The purpose of this Section and Section 4 
is to serve as a limit to taxation and as a protec-
tion to taxpayers." 
It \\'aS further held in -the casP of 11Joe vs. lVlillard 
County School District, "i1 Ctah 144; 179 P. 9RO, · 
that both express and implied contracts in violation 
of this provision are null and void. Thi~ 1NOuld 
seem to be un ansvver to the contention that if there 
is any involvement of the provisions of the said Sec-
tion 26 of Chapter 7, il is incidental and by implica-
tion only inasmuch as there ·would be no reference 
to it in the bonds themselves. 
A further ruling on this question \Vas made in 
the case of Fjeldsted ["S. Ogden Citr, 83 Utah 278, 28 
P. 2d 144. which held: 
"Necessary improvements mu~t be paid 
for either out of rcvcnm.'S within Treasury or 
such as may be lawfully anticipated llS reve-
nues of current year, or debt inctuTed for 
such im.provements must be authorized by 
majority vote of qualified electors as provided 
by this section (Senion 3, Article XIV), and 
be \Vithi.n constitutional limitations as re-
quired by Section 1· of Article XIY, Utah Con-
stitution, or be paid exclusivE'ly out of net 
earnings or incomes of property or improve-
ments purchased." 
In the very recent case of Srate vs. Spring City, 260 
P. 2d ')27, 530, it was held: 
13 
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"A municipality cannot, by issuing bonds, 
anticipate revenues in future years without 
an election. Any holding to the contrary to 
the case of Muir vs. Murray City is overruled." 
1be judicial· application of the said Section 3 of 
Article XIV is fur:ther emphasized in the State vs. 
Spring City case wherein the Court stated: 
"The constitutional provisions are en-
acted as a protection for the taxpayers against 
an abuse of their credit. The protection is ab-
solute in nature." 
The application to permanent improvements of 
constitutional provision against a county or munici-
pality exceeding cment revenue io;; discussed in some 
detail in 41 A.L.R. 790. The general rule is there 
stated as follows: 
"A statutory or constitutional clause 
\vhich prohibits a municipality from exceed-
ing its revenues is generally held to apply to 
expenseS incurred in building or acquiring 
permanent improvements. In the absence of 
an exception to the restricting provision, they 
cannot be acquired at a cost involving an ex-
penditure in excess of the year's revenue, 
although the building or improvement in 
question may be necessary to the municipalit:r 
in carrying out its functions." 
It is emphasized that under Chapter -; of Title 
17, the bonds that are to be issued are actually the 
bonds of the county. Chapter 7 does not E'VC'll pretend 
14 
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to create any separate corporation, organization, or 
entiry, and certainly makes no provision Ior any 
separate administrative or policy-forming officers or 
body of any kind \Yhatsoever. A careful reading of 
all of the sections of Chapter 7 shovvs that through-
out it is the county acting through its Board of 
County Commissioners. Hence, it is a justiliable con-
clusion that the bonds \'vhich would be issued and 
the debt which is created thereby pursuant to the 
above referred provisions of Sec,tion 26 is indebLed-
ness of the county and vvould be :in excess of the 
taxes for the current year in violation of Section 3 
of Article XIV. 
Since the county itself could not constitutionally 
create such an indebtedness, it should not be allowed 
to incur such indebtedness by circumvention through 
a sham entity or special improvement district under 
the provisions of Chapter 7, Title 17. Directly in 
point is the language of Lhe dissenting opinion in 
the recent Utah case of Barlow vs. Clearfield City 
Corporation, et al., 1 Utah 2d 419, 26c~, P. 2d 682. 
In the Barlow vs. Clearfield case referred to above, 
Clearfield City contracted with the VVeber Basin 
Water Conservancy Di<>trirt to purchase a quantity 
of water and pay for it in annual installments ex-
tending over a sixty year period. The City collects 
water revenues. It may make its contract payments 
to the District for such water from such water reve-
nues, but the City asslUlles no obligation on the part 
15 
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• 
of the contract, and cannot be coerced into making 
any payment thereon nor can it be coerced in levying 
a tax to enable it to make any payment thereon. If 
the City fails to make any part of the contract pay-
ment to the District from water revenues or other 
sources, then any unpaid balance must be paid 
through the collection of a tax levied by the District 
on the property \vithin the City. The amount of the 
contract obligation was clearly in excess of the con-
stitutional debt limitatioJJ allowed the City. How-
ever, the majority of the Court held that this arrange-
ment did not amount to an unconstitutional pledge 
of the credit of the City, nor create an indebtedness 
of the City because under the contract the City is 
not obligated to pay nor could it be coerced into 
levying a tax to pay the obligation of the contract. 
The dissenting opinion in the Barlow vs. Clear-
field case holds that such an arrangement amounts 
to the City saying that it will not pledge the future 
taxing power of the City, but by contract it will vest 
a statulory corporation (the District) with power 
to levy a future tax to pay an obligation created by 
contract that exceeds the constitutional debt limita-
tion. This dissenting opinion states: 
"Everyone agrees that this could not be 
done directly bv the citY because of the con-
stitutional debi limit. · The main opinion, 
ho\H'VE'r. says such circuit~· of technique satis-
fies constillltional requirements. I would say 
16 
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the constitution has not been satisfied, it has 
been circumvented, emasculated, and ignured. 
"After this decision, \vhat is to pre\'enl 
the Legislature from eliminating constitu-
tional debt limitations altogether by creating 
a dmnmy Board, authorized to promise any-
thing under any kind of a proposed project, 
and with power to back up that promise witt. 
absolute power to tax local citizens, perhaps 
against Lheir vdll, without their consent, aud 
\YiLhout any opportunity to voice their choice 
by sufferage? The answer is that there i~ 
nothing to prevent it, and \Ve may as well tear 
out the pages of the Constitution relaling to 
debt limitations on locrll governmental uniLs. 
It would seem to the -..Uiter that the main 
opinion gives the Legislative branch of gov-
ernment an absolute povver to delete, amend, 
modify, recognize or ignore the Constitution 
as hereafter it may choose." 
It is submitted that the facts of our case herein 
not only present a more pointcfl case for the applica-
tion of the reasoning of the di~senl of the Barlow us. 
Clearfield case, but because we here have at least 
two clements missing upon vvhich the reasoning or 
the majoriLy opinion in the Barlow case \Yas based, 
such majority opinion \vill support the contention 
that the creation of debts and tl1e pledge of taxing 
power allovved by Section 20 of Chapler 7 exceed 
the allowable constitutional debt limitation without 
an electi011. (1) In the Barlow case, the \Yater Con-
servancy District \vhich makes the levy, is a separate, 
distinct, fully organize~ and officered corporate 
17 
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entity. As has been previously pointed out above, 
Chapter 7 of Title 17 does not provide nor con-
template such a separate, organized, and officered 
entity, but its provisions would allow the county and 
its Board of County Commissioners through its sham 
creation to do what the constitution expressly pro-
hibits it from doing. (2) The provisions of the Sec-
tion 26 of Chapter 7 make it obligatory that the 
"board of county commissioners shall levy on all 
real property vvithin the issuing improvement dis-
tricts a special tax in an amormt sufficient to pre-
vent such default (on bond obligations) or if such 
default shall have occurred, sufficient' to remedy such 
default." In the Barlow case, as pointed out above, 
there is no such obligation on the City in the event 
the City does not make the required contract pay-
ments. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the said Chapter 
7, and particularly Section 26 thereof, violates the 
debt limitation as provided by Section 3 of Article 
XIV of the Utah Constitution. 
Point IV. 
lssuonce of County Bonds as Provided by 17-7-
21, 22 and 23, U.C.A., 1953, as Amended Violo;lles 
Debt Limitation of Section 4 of Article XIV of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Section ·1· of Article XIY of the Ctah Constitution 
reads in part as follows: 
18 
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"VVhen authorized to create indebtedness 
as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no 
county shall become indebted to an amount, 
including existing indebtedness, exceeding 
two per centum." 
As is set forth in detail in the argument on 
Point III above, it is the pledge of the county\ credit 
and future taxing povver as allmved b~, Section ~(j of 
Chapter 7 which flctually makes the bonds to be 
issued of worth and marketable. It is contended, 
therefore, that not only will there be the creation of 
an unauthorized indebtedness by the issuance of the 
bonds, but the debt created by such bonds could 
well exceed the two per cent debt limitation of Sec-
tion 4 of Article XIV. 
Further, said Chapter 7 is unconstitutional and 
void in that said Chapter fails to provide the manner 
in which the debt Umitation of 2S{, imposed on coun-
ties by Section 4 of Article XIV of the Etah Constitu-
tion is to be applicable, and it is impossible to ascer-
tain whether the two per ceilt limitation is to be 
computed on the basis of all taxable prope1iy in the 
county, or on all taxable property in the improve-
ment district, or on the real property in the im-
provement district, and it is accordingly impossible 
to ascertain \-Vhether bonds issued pursuant to said 
Chapter 7 will be issued in violation of such consti-
tutional restriction. 
19 
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• 
Point V. 
Special Tax Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A., 1953, 
as Amended, on Only Real Property Within the District 
Violates Sections 2 gnd 3 of Article XIII of the Utah 
Constitution which Require "All Tangible Property" to 
be Assessed and Taxed. 
The pertinent part of Section 2 of Article XIII 
reads as follows: 
"All tangible property Hl the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States. 
or under this constitution, shall be taxed ill 
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
pr~vided by law." 
The pel·tinent portion of Section 3 of Article 
XIII reads as follows: 
"The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment and 
taxation on 'all tangible property' in the state, 
according to its value in money, and shall pre-
scribe by law such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of such property, 
so that every person and corporation shall pay 
a tax in proportion to the value o£ his, or it< 
tangible property." 
Since the iPYY provided and allowed by the 
said Section 26 of Chapter 7 is a tax, and in fact, is 
designated Uy the wording of the Section as ·'a spe-
cial ta,.," it must comply with the above referred to 
constitutional requirements as to assessment and 
20 
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taxation on "all tangible property." Emphasis is 
given to plaintiffs' contention that the levy provided 
by the said Section 26 is a tax rather than an assess-
ment in that said Section provides for no notice or 
hearing as would be required in the event it \Vas con-
strued to be an assessment. \lore will be said about 
this later. 
Section 26 in providing for the levy of the special 
tax does not even squint at compliance with the above 
referred to constitutional requirements. Section 26 
provides that when the levy of the special tax o.hall 
be made, the board of county commissioners, 
the 
tax. 
"Shall levy on all real property 
issuing improvement district a 
" 
within 
special 
This tax shall pertain only to real property and 
only to real property ·within the District. The Sec-
tion's own language contemplates violation of the 
above constitutional requirements that such levies 
must be assessed and taxed against all tangible prop-
erty and that it must extend at least to all tangible 
property within the county. 
In an early case, the Ctah Court held that 
taxation must be uniform and must be againq all 
property \Vithin the confines of Lhe governmental 
unit levying the tax. The Court in the case of Con-
tinental .. Yational Bank of Salt Lake City vs. Naylor, 
54 Utah 49, 179 P. 67 stated as follmYs: 
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"Taxation should be uniform upon all 
property within a jurisdiction of authority 
levying tax." 
I<Urther, the Utah court had this to say con-
cerning the equality and impartialhy o£ a tax in the 
case of /\err vs. Woolley, 3 Utah, 456, 24 P. 831: 
"Tax law which fails to secure equality 
and impartiality of the tax authorized, and 
which fails to provide for an adjustment and 
equalization of assessments, or guarantees for 
the economical, faithful and partial adminis-
tration of the law, is void." 
Point VI. 
Special Tax Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A. 1953, as 
Amended, Would be to Pay a Private Debt in Viole~tion 
of Section 5, Article XIII, Utclh Constitution. 
Section 26 of Chapter 7 provides for a special 
tax against non-defaulting landowners \Yithin !fte 
District to cover the default of other landowners. The 
pertinent language of Section 26 is as follows: 
""
7herever it shall appear that the spe-
cial assessments pledged to the payment of 
any special improvement bonds issued here-
under have not been or will not be collected 
in amounts sufficient to assure the prompt pay-
ment of all principal and interest due on such 
bonds, the board of county commissioners 
shall levy on all real property within the 
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issuing improvement district a special tax in 
an amount sufficient to prevent such default, 
or if such default shall have occurred, suffi-
cient to remedy such default." 
This is an assessment or tax to pay a private de-
fault or debt, and violates Section 5 of Article 13 
which has been construed to mean that the taxing 
power vested in counties shall be used only for pub-
lic purposes. Reference is made to the reasoning and 
argument set forth under Point II above which is 
fully applicable here. 
Further, the special tax contemplated by Sec-
tion 26 violates the provisions of Chapter 7 \vhich pro-
vide that the assessment against any piece of land 
Vl'ill be only in an amount equal to the benefit to be 
derived by the land from the proposed improvement. 
This basic principle governing the amount of any 
particular assessment is carefully set forth in Sections 
13 and 14 of Chapter 7. It is clear, therefore, that 
if the landowners who make their payment which 
has been arrived at after a determination that such 
payment is equal to the benefit conferred on their 
land are to be taxed and required to make further 
payments to cover the delinquencies of defaulting 
landowners in order that the bond obligations ·will 
not be in default, then they are, in fact, paying mon' 
than what their land will be benefited. This would 
not only be a violation of constitutional guarantees 
pertaining to equal and uniform rates of taxation 
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• 
but it would clearly violate the govenring principle 
of benefit in detennining the amount of an assess-
ment set forth in Sections 13 and 11· as above indi-
cated. The l:tah Court had occasion to discuss and 
rule on a question similar to this in the case of /Velson 
vs. Board of Commissioners of Davis County, et al. 62 
Utah 218, 218 P. 952. This case concerned an annual 
tax levied by an irrigation district to meet the accru-
ing bond obligations. The statutes involved in creat-
ing the irrigation district provided that the annual 
tax to be levied could include an excess of up to 15% 
over its obligations to cover delinquencies. Hm-vever, 
there \Vere very substantinl defaults by the land-
ovvners so that the district fell far short of meeting 
it~ bond obligations. In the subsequent year, the 
Hoard of County Commissioners attempted to levy 
a tax \Vhich exceeded the amount necessary to meet 
the current year's bond_ obligations and also was 
very substantially in excess of the allowable 15% pro-
vided by the statute. Non-defaulting property own-
ers within the district brought an action in the 
Supreme Court for u writ of prohibition against the 
county \\hich \vas granted. The Court stated that 
the amount of the tax allowed to be leyjed is con-
trolled by the benefit conferred, and indicated that 
it would not even have been possible to assess a tax 
fifteen per cent in excess of the benefits conferred if 
it had not been expressly provided for by the statutes. 
·!be Court used the following language: 
2-l· 
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"It would, theref(}re, seem t(} be conclu-
sive that a tax levied against property in an 
irrigation district is governed and controlled 
by the benefits received by each landm.vner 
and for that reason a landuvvncr cannot and 
should not be penalized further than is pro-
vided in the act for his pro-rata share of de-
linquencies of other property owners in fail-
ing to pay the tax assessed against their prop-
erty." 
It is conceivable that the defaults of landovvners 
within the District as contemplated by Section 26 
could amount to such a substantial sum that if the 
non-defaulting 1and0\vners vvere required to make 
good on such defaults, the benefits derived by their 
land would be grossly out of balance ·with the total 
required payments. This -.vould be destructive of the 
theory upon which assessments for improvement 
districts arc allmved and -.vhich are spelled out in 
detail in the said Sections 13 and 11· of Chapter 7 as 
referred to above. Other cases illustrating this point 
are: Wayne County Savings Bank vs. Roscommon 
Township, 96 Mich. 630, 56 K'V 9++, and lluey vs. 
Jackson Parish, 33 L.A. Ann. 1091. 
• 
Point VII. 
Speciol Levy Provided by 17-7-26 U.C.A., 1953, 
os Amended, is Allowed Wilt.out Notice or Hearing in 
Violation of the "Due Process" Clause of the Four-
teentt. Amendment of the United States Constitution 
ond Section 7, Article I, Utah Constitution. 
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The pertinent part of Section 26 has previously 
been set out above and allows for the levy of a spe-
cial tax to pay bond obligations without making any 
provision for any notice and hearing before the levy 
of such special tax. 
If the special tax to be imposed by the said Sec-
tion 26 is held to be a special assessment against 
real property and not a tax, Section 26 is rmconstitu-
tional because no provision is made therein for notice 
and hearing conceming benefits before .the levy is 
made, thus violating the "due process of law" clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States and Section 7 of Article I of the 
Constitution of Utah. This clause and section have 
been construed by the Court to prohibit the imposi-
tion of special assessments without the giving of due 
notice and the holding of a hearing on benefits. 
It is respectfully suggested that the defendants 
must take a position in regard to the special levy 
allmved by Section 26. It is either special tax or an 
assessment, and the defendants should not be allowed 
to treat it as an assessment to get around constitu-
tional limitations which would apply if it \vere a 
tax and then tun1 around and treat it as a tax in 
order to get around constitutional limitations which 
would apply if it is an assessment. 
It is important to note that Sections 12, 13 and 
f4. of Chapter 7 recognize the need for and do pro-
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vide a notice and hearing to determine if the indi-
vidual properties ·will be benefited in the amount 
of the original proposed assessment and to see that 
each property bears its "proportionate" share. Hmv-
ever, there is no provision for such notice, hearing, 
or detennination as to the special levy allowed by 
the said Section 26. Since the entire theory behind 
the levies that are allowed by Chapter 7 are based 
upon and made valid because of the value of the 
benefits to be conferred upon the individual land, 
then any levy that would be allowed and made 
under Section 26 would be in violation of "due pro-
cess of law." 
The rule in regard to the right of notice and 
a chance to be heard prior to the making of an 
assessment is set forth in 48 Am. Jur.-Special or 
Local Assessments, Section 156, page 696. It is there 
stated: 
" ... it has been ruled that where the 
Legislature of a state does not itself act in 
determining an improvement district or area 
or in making a special or local assessment, 
but delegates the po-.,vcr to do the same to some 
subordinate body (which i~ the situation 
under our Chapter 7l due process o[ la\V re-
quires that at some stage of Lhe proceedings 
before the assessment becomes irrevocably 
fixed, the property owner shall have an op-
portunity to be heard, of \Vhich he must have 
notice either personal, by publication, or by 
a la>V fixing the time and place of the hear-
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• 
ing. The proceedings in such instance are in 
their nature judicial in the sense that such 
a right to notice and hearing exists. Under 
this rule, it matters not, upon the question of 
the colL~titutionality of such a law, that the 
assessment has, in fact, been fairly appor-
tioned. The constitutional validity of the law 
is to be tested not by what has been done 
under it, but by what may, by its authority, 
be done .... The protective principal that 
notice and opportunity to be heard must be 
allowed is applicable in all cases where such 
rights are essential, whhout reference to the 
value of the property sought to be subjected 
or Lhe amounL of tax sought to he levied." 
The further rule in regard Lo Lhe 1JecessiLy of a notice 
and hearing in regard to reassessments or additional 
assessments is set forth in 48 Am. Ju.r.-Special or 
Local Assessments, Section 159, page 700 wherein it 
is stated: 
"It has been ruled that a notice of re-
assessment or additional assessment must be 
given." 
The C S. Supreme Court CfbE' of Bellingham 
Bay and British Columbia Railroad Company l'S. Cit1· 
of New Whatcom. 172 U.S. 31-1-. +3 I.. Rd. +fiO, 19 S. 
Ct. 205, reaffirms the uece~~ity of some kind of notice 
of a reassP~SmPnt. In this cuse there was a reassess-
ment to cover Lhe cost of street improvements after 
the first assessment had failed. The case turned upon 
the sufficiency of the notice that was giYc>n. but the 
case unequivocally stated as follows: 
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"That notice of reassessment was essential is 
not questioned." In support of this rule, the opin:illn 
of the Court refers to the case of Davidson vs. iVew 
Orleam, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar vs. Reclamation Dis-
trict lVo. 108, 111 L.S. 701; Cooley on Taxation, 266. 
The necessity of notice and hearing in connec-
tion with an assessment is set forth in Utah case of 
Argyle vs. Johnson, 39 Utah 500, 118 P. 487. In this 
case it was held that the drainage act there assailed 
was fatally defective because iL did not provide an 
opportunity for the landowner to be heard before 
some competent tribunal on the question ,..,.hether 
his lands were benefited by the project, and, if so, 
whether the assessments were fair and just prior to 
the time when the lien on the lands for delinquent 
assessments should become irrevocably established, 
or the lands could be sold for delinquent assessments. 
In the case of llarmon vs. Rolley, 187 Indiana 
511, 120 NE. 3.3, 2 A.L.R. 609, the Court had before 
it a statute authorizing special assessments for the 
cleaning and repairing of drainage ditches in the 
same proportion as the original assessment for the 
cost of the construction thereo(, and the Court held 
such statute void. The Court there formded its de-
cision on the ground that the statute denied due pro-
cess of law by failing to provide for notice and a 
hearing on the question of actual benefiL to the 
landowner. 
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The Utah Court had squarely before it this mat-
ter of notice and hearing and due process of law in 
the very recent case of Bigler vs. Greenwood, 2H P. 
2d, 843. In that case, the county had before it a 
similar problem of vwrking out an adequate financ-
ing arrangement that would give stability and sub-
stance to the bonds that were to be issued. The 
county wanted the benefits to be derived from a 
simple "revenue bond" financing arrangement, and 
also the benefits of an assessment financing arrange-
ment which would result in a lien against land, but 
they did not provide for the notice and hearing re-
quired for assessment financing. Although the 
Bigler case involved a sewer district, the financing 
arrangement had much the same dilemma that we 
find in Section 26. 
Section 26 designates the levy a "Special Tax" 
but endeavors to give it the status and character-
istics of a special assessment. The Court in the Bigler 
case refused to let the county ride both ho-rns of this 
proposition. The Bigler opinion discusses in some 
detail \vhether or not the proposed financing ar-
rangement before them amounts to revenue bonds 
or assessment financing. In so doing, they reaffirm 
the law as to the necessity of notice and hearing 
being necessary for the validity of the assessment. It 
is there stated: 
''In the latter class of cases (assessment 
financing' the law is well established by our 
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previous decision that due process of law does 
require notice and an opportunity to be heard 
prior to the imposition of a lien upon one's 
poperty." 
Further, the Bigler case construed the financing ar-
rangement to be one of an assessment and lien and 
uses the following language in its decision: 
"If this plan which was obviously de-
signed for the purpose and actually had the 
effect of imposing liens upon the property 
could be follmved and yet remain classified 
as a purely voluntary 'revenue bond' financ-
ing program, then the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process of la'\'v and debt limits could 
be circumvented while effectively creating 
charges upon property. The District should 
not be permitted to accomplish by artifice, sub--
terfuge, or indirection what the law will not 
permit it to do openly and directly." 
It is submitted that the above language of the 
Bigler case is wholly appropriate to the provisions 
of Section 26 \vhich attempt to provide for a special 
assessment under a guise of a special tax \vithout 
providing or requiring any notice and opporttmity 
to be heard and violates the due proce-ss of law clauses 
of the federal and state constitutions. 
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• 
Point VIII. 
The Priority of the Levy of Asses!iltlent os Pro-
vided by 17-7-19 U.C.A. 1953, as Amended, is ln-
volid. 
Section 1() of Chapter 7 aLtempts to define the 
priority given the levy of assessments provided for 
Chapter 7 with the following language: 
'·Spedal assessments levied hereunder 
shall rank on an equality with taxes levied 
against the property assessed by the state, the 
county and any taxing district thereof and 
no sale of property for the non-payment of 
taxes or other special assessment shall ex-
tinguish the lien of other than the taxes or 
special assessments for the non-payment of 
vvhich such sale is made .... The lien of spe-
cial assessments levied hereunder shall be 
superior to all other liens against the property 
assessed except that it shall be on a parity -.,vith 
the lien of ad valorem taxes and the lien of 
other special assessments and shall be effec-
tive from and after the date upon which the 
notice of levy is published." 
The above pt·uv isions of Section 19, Chapter 7 
pertaining to the rank or parit:\· of assessments made 
thereunder is vague and uncertain and impossible 
of application and use in that it i~ impossible to 
delf'l'mine therefrom t1IP nmk or parity of such 
assessments. It attempts to give such levies the same 
rank as general taxes, but since general taxes have 
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a rank depending on the year of their levy, this 
reference to the rank of general taxes is of no use _ 
in determining rank or parity. Further, since the 
rank of such assessment determines whether the 
statute will be workable or not and whether the 
bonds will be marketable when issued, this am-
biguity and uncertainty renders the statute invalid. 
Further reference to the question of the ambiguity 
and uncertainty of this statute "\-Vill be made in Point 
IX below. 
The priority which is attempted to be given the 
levy of assessments provided by Chapter 7 is also 
inconsistent with and contrary to the provisions of 
59-10-3 e.C.A. 1953, which defines the nature and 
extent of liens created by every tax upon real prop-
erty. 1bis statute reads as follows: 
"Every tax upon real property is a lien 
against the property assessed; and every tax 
due upon improvements upon real estate 
assessed to others than the owners of the real 
estate is a lien upon the land and improve-
ments; which several liens attach as of the 
first day in January of each year." 
1be Utah Court hns had occasion to clearly rule on 
the superiority of the lien of general tnxes under 
the above referred to statute. In the case of Robinson 
vs. Hanson, 75 Ltah 30, 282 P. 782, the Court 
held: 
"Under this Section, taxes for general 
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goverrnnental purposes are paramonnt to all 
other demands against the taxpayer, although 
the statute :imposing the tax does not expressly 
declare such a priority. Accordingly, it is 
superior to tax levied by drainage district." 
The general rule as to the priority of the vari-
ous types of tax liens is set out in 31 Am. Jur._:__ 
Taxation, Section 1017, page 888 as follows: 
"Most courts hold, however, that when 
taxes against a particular piece of property or-
on land are made a lien on such property or 
land, the tax lien will have priority over all 
other liens against that particular property in 
question, whether attaching before or after 
the tax lien., even though the statute does n(}t 
in express terms make the tax lien a first or 
prior lien. 
"The broad general rule has been stated 
to be that liens of general taxes are superior to 
other liens, unless the legislature has clearly 
declared the contrary." 
Our Legislature has spoken on this matter as is 
set out in 59-10-3 U.C.A. 1933, as amended, and 
quoted in full above, and our Courts have interpreted 
this Section to mean that the lien for general taxes 
is prior to the lien for any special improvements. 
Such a holding is consistent with the theory that gen-
eral taxes represent a claim for the necessary support 
for the government and such a claim is a higher 
obligation than the demands for the cost of local 
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improvements, even though the latter have quasi-
public features. The Utah ca~e of Western Beverage 
Company of Provo, Utah vs. Hanson, 96 P. 2d 1105, 
sets down this rule in regard to a conflict in statutes 
pertaining to the lien of a general tax and a lien 
for special assessments: 
"In the case of a conflict between Section 
of revised statute relating to general tax lien 
and another relating to lien for special assess-
ments, requiring one section to yield to the 
other, the section relating to the general tax 
which supports governmental functions must 
prevail. The sale of property by the county for 
general taxes initiated a new unencumbered 
title from a sGverign state and extinguished 
lien of city for special improvement assess-
ments, Legislative intention being to make all 
liens other than liens for general taxes subject 
to lien for general taxes \Yhich should persist 
until payment of general taxes." 
Reference is made to an annotation appearing 
at 11 A.L.R. 2d 1133 concerning the priority of 
liens for general taxes and special assessments. It is 
there stated as follows: 
"It has been stated as a general principle 
that the lien of a special assessment is sub-
ordinate to a lien for general tax«s and is 
extinguished by sale of the land to satisfy the 
general Lax lien." 
This same annotation refers to a number of cases 
in support of this proposition. The following lan-
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guage is taken from the case of Pennsylvania Com-
pany vs. Tacoma, 36 Wash. 656, 79 P. 306: 
''\·Ve have so often decided that the lien 
·for general taxes is paramount to all other 
claims and liens, including the lien of assess-
ments for local improvements, that the ques-
tion is no longer an open one in this Court.'' 
H would appear from the above authorities and 
many more that could be cited that the attempt of 
Section 19 of Chapter 7 to give the levy of assess-
ments provided by Chapter 7 equal priority V\'ith the 
lien of general Laxes must fail and the sHme should 
be declared invalid. 
Point IX. 
Chgpler 7 is so Vggue Gnd Uncertoin gs to be 
lnoperotive gnd Void. 
The plaintiffs preface their argument with the 
follmving rule concerning the necessit)- for certainty 
and clearness in a statute set forth in 50 Am. Jur.-
Statutes, Section 472, page 484: 
"In the enactment of statutes reasonable 
precision is required. Indeed, one of the prime 
requisites of any statute i~ certainty, and legis-
lative enactment may be declared by the 
courts to be inoperative and void for uncer-
tainty in the meaning thereof." 
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Reference is made to all of the foregoing points 
relied upon, and the arguments made in connection 
therewith as ample evidence that Chapter 7 is so 
ambiguous and uncertain as to be impossible of 
construction and use. It is impossible to determine 
from Chapter 7 what type of entity the statute at-
tempts to create to act in carrying out the provisions 
of the statute. It is impossible to ascertain whether 
the bonds to be issued are intended to be bonds of a 
county or a district. It is impossible to ascertain 
whether the taxes to be levied thereunder arc county 
or district taxes. It is impossible to ascertain whether 
such levies amonnt to a general or special tax or an 
assessment for local improvements. 
\Vhile the Chapter purports to create an Im-
provement district, no where is there any provision 
or requirement for the creation of a separate corpora-
tion or entity nor is there auy provision or require-
ment for such a separate entity to have officers, direc-
tors or particular employees of any kind. Rather, the 
provisions of Chapter 7 call for the county or the 
county acting through its Board of County Com-
missioners to fonnulate all policies and perform all 
acts that are required to carry out the provisions o( 
the Chapter. It is the Board of County Commissioners 
\'vhich issues the bonds. They are designated as bonds 
of the Board of County Commissioners. 
It is imperative to the validity of such a statute 
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• 
as this to have these questions defiiled with certainty 
because of the different rights and obligations which 
\vill follow from the entity and the status and rela-
tionship that v.ill be created by the Statute. If, 
under the Statute, it is deemed that it is the county 
which acts in carrying out and implementing the 
Statute, it will have different power and authority 
than if it is deemed that the statute intends to create 
a separate district or other entity to act. If the acting 
party is the county, it has certain constitutional limi-
tations pertaining to the creation of debt or the 
pledging of its taxing powers. If the acting party 
is the district or some other entity, then it may not 
tax, but have latitude in the creation of debt. These 
and other differences have been described in detail 
in the other Points Relied Upon set out above. 
The following is an additional statement of the 
law concerning the requisite definiteness and cer-
tainty required of the statute set forth in 50 Am. Jur. 
-Statutes, Section 472, page 48+-485 and it refers 
to when the power of a court may be exercised to 
declare a statute inoperative and void for uncer-
tainty: 
"This power may be exeicised when the 
statute is so incomplete, or so irreconcilably 
conflicting or indefinite, that the statute can-
not be executed and the court is unable by the 
application of known and accepted rules of 
construction to determine vvhat the Legisla-
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ture intended with any reasonable degree of 
certainty." 
In this same American Jurisprudence section on 
page 486 in a further elaboration as to the certainty 
necessary for the validity of a statute it is stated: 
"In order that a statute may be held 
valid, the duty imposed by it must be pre-
scribed in terms definite enough to serve as a 
guide to those who have a duty imposed upon 
them. Indeed, where the meaning of a statute 
cannot be judicially ascertained, the Courts 
are not at liberty to supply the sufficiency or 
undertake to make the statute definite and 
certain. In determining whether a statute is 
void for uncertainty, the statute should be 
considered as a whole." 
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to prGvide a means 
whereby sorely needed improvements can be made 
in many places in several counties CJ.f the state. 
Plaintiffs do not quarrel vvith the vvorthvvhile objec-
tives of the Statute. However, there must be pro-
vided a workable definitive statute that is framed 
within constitutional requirements and limitations 
to accomplish these objectives. To proceed under a 
statute that is no-t so- framed would have fatal ramifi-
cations and numerous disastrous pitfalls which vvould 
defeat rather than accomplish the purposes hoped 
for under the Statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Chapter 7, Title 
17, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, is unconstitutional and 
invalid in its entirety and in the particulars set 
f-orth in the Points III through IX inclusive above, 
and, further, that the proposed actions of the de-
fendants nnder the provisions of said Chapter 7 as 
outlined in Point I and II above arc in violation of 
the provisions of the chapter itself and of the Utah 
Constitution. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-
. -
mitted that the decision of the Trial Court should 
be disaffirmed and reversed vvith _instructions to the 
Court to enter judgment as follows; 
1. Chapter 7, Title 17 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, is unconstitutional and invalid 
in its entirety. 
2. The lack of uniformity as to the kind of 
improvements to be made in connection with each 
piece of property within the improvement district 
violates the Statute and makes it impossible of appli-
cation and use. 
3. The construction of private driveways as 
contemplated by the defendants and the Special 
Improvement District No. 1 of Salt Lake County 
would violate Section 5 of Article XIII of the Uah 
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Constitution, and this violation 'vould not be cured 
hy the written request and consent of the properly 
owners in the Improvement District. 
+. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, violates Section 3 of Article XIV 
of the Utah Constitution, and is rmconstitutional, 
void, ineffective and 'vithout force of law. 
5. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.\., 
1953, as amended, violates Section 4 of Article XIV 
of the Utah Constitution, and is unconstitutional, 
void, ineffective and vdthout force of law. 
' 6. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, LC.A .. 
19·i3, as amended, violates Section ·j of Article XIII 
of the L'tah Constitution. and is unconstitutional, 
void, ineffective and without force of lavv. 
7. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, violates the }ourtcenth Amend-
ment of the L niled States Constitution, and is un-
constitutional, void, ineffective and 'vithout force 
of law. 
8. Sf'clion 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, l".C.A., 
1953, as amemled; violates Section 7 of Article I of 
the Utah Constitution and is unconstitutional, void 
ineffective aml vdthout force of Ia-.,v. 
9. Section 26 of Chapter 7. Title 17. lJ.C .. .\., 
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• 
19'53, as aniended, violates Section 2 of Article XIII 
of the Utah Cori.Stilution, and- is urtconstitutiOnal 
. ' 
void, irieffective~ and without force of law. l'• a',. ' 
'··· --:;;,. -n~;_ 
10. Sectio-n 26 of Chapter 7, Title ,-17, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, violates Section 3 of Article XIII 
of the rtah Constitution,~ and is uTtcOhStitutional, 
void, ineffective and without force of law. 
11. Section '19 of Chapter 7, Title 17, C.C.A., 
1953, as amended, is incom;i.;;tcnt -with and would 
violate 59-10-3 U.C.A., 1953, and is contrary to the 
rule of la\v thai: taxes for general governmental 
purposes are paramount to all other demands against 
the taxpayer, although the statute imposing the tax 
doE;s not expressly declare such priority, and is in-
valid and without force of law. 
12. Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, is so vague and ambiguous as to be im-
possible of construction and use and is, therefore, 
void, ineffective, and without force of law. 
13. 1be defendants, and each of them, their 
agents, and servants, are permanently restrained 
and enjoined from proceeding or taking any actions 
under and pursuant to Chapter i. Title 17. U.C.A., 
1953, as amended. 
t+. The plaintiffs are not required to comply 
with and shall not be bound and their property in 
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said District shall not, be aff~cted by any actions, 
proceedings, or levy of as~e.ssments . that may be 
taken or made .by. the defendants, their agents and 
servants, pursuant to Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended. 
15. The plaintiffs to have and recover their 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lyle M. Ward 
of OWEN & WARD 
Cotmsel for the Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
141 East Second SOuth Street 
Salt Lake City: Utah 
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